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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper was to establishing the effect of audit committee size and experience on firm 
performance among listed firms in Nairobi securities exchange, Kenya.. The study is informed by agency theory 
and institutional theory. The study was conducted in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange for the 
period ranging from 2006 to 2011. Multiple Regressions was used to test hypothesis. Research findings showed 
that audit committee experience and audit committee size a has a significant effect on firm performance. The 
presence of audit members with experience will also reduce financial misreporting and enhance quality 
monitoring. As such, having experienced audit committee members should be a key priority for firms. Also there 
is need for firms to have an audit committee that is not too small such that there is lack of expert advice and too 
large such that it has free riders that are prone to follow other members opinion. 
Keywords: audit committee experience, audit committee size, firm performan 
 
1.1 introductions  
Financial performance has implications to organization’s health and ultimately its survival. The Firms’ 
management effectiveness and efficiency in making use of company’s resources is highly reflected by high 
financial performance and this in turn contributes to the country’s economy at large (Naser & Mokhtar, 2004). A 
growing stream of research suggests that audit committee characteristics are critically important to the firm 
performance (Abbott et al., 2003).  
Corporate governance literature  emphasize the need for audit committees to be comprised of members 
who are independent, including some of whom to possess financial expertise and for the audit committee to 
impact positively on firms financial health (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2004). The evidence in this area 
of research is unclear, however board and audit committee expertise has been shown to enhance firm value 
(Chan and Li, 2008; Bronson et al., 2009).  
This study is anchored within the agency theory; the empirical studies increasingly recognize that audit 
committees have a central role in reducing agency problems (Zahra, Pearce 1989). Agency theory argues that the 
delegation of managerial responsibilities by principals (owners) and agents (managers) requires the presence of 
mechanisms that either align the interests of principals and agents or monitor the performance of managers to 
ensure that they use their delegated powers in the best interests of the principals. It has been argued that weak 
internal or external auditing, controlling and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify the traditional 
principal agent problems in transitioning economies (Dharwadkar et al.2000). 
Studies carried out in developed economies such as Kenya often argue that the auditing system in it is 
comprehensive and is thoroughly backed by the law in order to maintain the impartiality, objectivity and 
independence of statutory auditing process. Unfortunately, it has been observed over the time that the auditing 
system in Kenya  has become susceptible to various types of accounting manipulations, irregularities and 
leakages; therefore, harming the interests of investors and other stakeholders.  
The operations of audit committees in a developing country may differ when compared to practices in 
developed countries. This study attempts to understand, how audit committees operate in developing countries, 
the size and experience and their effect on financial performance for companies listed on the Nairobi securities 
exchange.  Corporate governance literature always argue that audit committee participates, not only in the 
process whereby management disseminate information to the auditors and releasing unbiased information 
reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders; but also play an important role in ensuring that 
statutory auditors are not in the influence of management, therefore audit committees can be used as a 
mechanism to reduce agency problems faced by firms, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), The composition and 
character of the audit committee play significant role in influencing quality of an organization performance 
Cadbury, 1995). 
Previous studies in  developed economies such as Kenya  disclosed a challenge that  many audit 
committee members do not possess the necessary skills, knowledge and experience to act as audit committee 
members and perform their duties optimally Cascarino & Van Esch (2005); it also revealed the existence of 
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management challenge to an apparent lack of available non-executive directors (NEDs) with the required 
business acumen and accounting background who are willing to serve on audit committees Njunga (2000). 
However, very few studies have addressed or even shown how audit committee composition and character 
influence firm’s financial performance in developing countries such as Kenya. Chang and Singh (2000)argues 
that assessing the relative impact of audit committee size, number of independent auditors, audit committee 
gender diversity and audit committee experience on performance has received scant empirical study. 
Furthermore, these issues have only been seldom addressed within the context of NSE firms. Therefore this 
research study hypothesized that; 
Ho1: Audit committee size has no significant effect on firm performance  
Ho2: Audit committee experience has no significant effect on firm performance  
Theoretical Framework  
The Agency Theory  
The separation of ownership and control in modern business creates conflicts of interest between managers and 
stakeholders. Following this conflict was between the principal and the agent, companies are obliged to use 
control mechanisms to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry like the audit committees (Kalbers & al 
1998). Similarly Pincus & al (1989) argues that audit committees are used primarily in situations where agency 
costs are high to improve the quality of information flows from the agent to the principal. According to the 
agency theory, to ensure the effectiveness of an audit committee, managers are encouraged to prepare financial 
statements adequately to specify the return generated by the companies. 
Beasley (1996) and Felo & al (2003) based on the agency theory provide for the existence of a positive 
and significant relationship between the presence of an audit committee and the quality of financial statements. 
Similarly Mc Mullen (1996), based on the agency theory, finds a positive relationship between the existence of 
an audit committee and the reliability of financial statements. The agency theory states that the presence of an 
audit committee within the board of directors is sufficient to ensure the reliability of financial statements. 
However, Beasley (1996) concluded that the mere presence of an audit committee does not necessarily mean that 
this committee is effective in performing its oversight role. 
The Institutional Theory  
In addition to work focused on agency theory, many research on audit committees have relied on an institutional 
perspective (Scott 1995 and Zaman 2002). The principle of institutional theory is defined by the fact that an 
organization consists of cultural, social and symbolic that constitutes its broader institutional environment 
(DiMaggio& al 1983). The adoption and the operation of audit committees were discussed based on this 
perspective to the extent it suggests that the audit committee can influence and be influenced by a multiplicity of 
agents (Zaman2002).  
Similarly Zaman (2002) states that this perspective can enhance the role of professional bodies and the 
promotion of regulatory audit committees. In this regard to better perform the function of monitoring and control 
efficiently, which some authors Klein (2002) and Bryan &al (2004) have stressed the importance of certain 
characteristics related to the members that form the audit committee.  
Likewise, the report Vienot (1995) provides that the audit committee’s main task is “to ensure the 
relevance and consistency of the accounting policies adopted for the consolidated financial statements and the 
company’s social and verifies that the internal procedures for collecting and monitoring information guarantee 
them. In the same furrow, Spira (2003) states that the audit committee has the ultimate aim of defending the 
interests of investors and reduce agency problems of companies characterized by informational asymmetries. In 
addition, Spira (2003) showed that the audit committee is an effective body to protect the interests of 
shareholders and ensure the reliability of information disclosed. 
Empirical Reviews  
Anderson et al, (2004) argues that  if the size of a team is large, individual members may be more vulnerable to 
the pressures and more subject to follow the others’ opinion without giving another argument. In this case, the 
audit committee members are not likely willing to question the potential errors in the accounting reports of the 
internal review process, which in turn can lead to a greater chance of presenting again later.  Conversely a small 
team will facilitate the exchange of information in the firm and a better discussion between members, to assist 
management to identify potential errors in financial reporting and reduce the incidence of restatement of the 
minimum size requirements. A large committee may suffer from the problem of free riders, From previous 
studies; the performance of the audit committee was determined by the number of audit committee members. 
These variables have been tested in previous studies conducted by (Xie et al., 2003). 
The results showed that the size of the audit committee and to devote more resources is more likely to 
oversee financial reporting and internal control systems within a firm hence high performance (Anderson et al, 
2004.) and facilitate discussions between the audit committee members (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Empirical 
evidence shows that companies with greater audit committee size prefer to suspicious auditor switches 
(Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001) and more likely to have lower costs of debt (Anderson et. Al, 2004.). Since 
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the exchange, the effect now requires their registrants to have at least three directors on the audit committee, 
hence a strong relationship between audit committee size and firm performance. 
Sharma et al. (2009) found evidence that the number of AC meetings is negatively associated with 
multiple directorships, audit committee independence and an independent AC chair. They find a positive 
association between the higher risk of financial misreporting and AC size, institutional and managerial 
ownership, financial expertise and independence of the board. Hence it is argued that the number of members on 
the audit committee and number of meetings can potentially have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Similarly Pincus show that firms with larger audit committees are expected to devote greater resources 
to monitor the process of “reporting” accounting and finance. In the same furrow, Anderson & al (2004) found 
that large size audit committees can protect and control the process of accounting and finance with respect to 
small committees by introducing greater transparency with respect shareholders and creditors which has a 
positive impact on the financial performance of the company 
Consistent with this argument, a study of Anderson et al. (2004) showed that the cost of debt is reduced 
while increasing audit committee experience; shown to improve the performance of the company to reduce debt. 
Xieet.al. (2003) found that the number of negative audit meetings related to discretionary accruals (DAC) The 
topic of audit committee financial expertise has been widely discussed by accounting researchers. Questions 
were also raised by public investors whether the exchange requirements of financial reporting and financial 
expertise of audit committee members have been well addressed (SEC, 2002). Raghunandan et al. (2001) find 
that committees comprised of at least one member having an accounting or finance background are more likely 
to have longer meetings with the chief internal auditor; provide private access to the chief internal auditor; and 
review internal audit proposals and results of internal auditing. Likewise, the financial expertise of audit 
committee may also affect audit services 
Abbott et al. (2003) document that audit committee financial expertise is significantly, positively 
associated with audit fees. Information content of audit committee financial expertise has already been 
documented. Defond et al. (2005) claim that a positive market reaction to the appointment of financial experts 
assigned to audit committees is found however, there is no reaction to non-financial experts assigned to audit 
committees. Davidson et al. (2004) show significant positive stock price reaction when new members of audit 
committees have financial expertise.  
Archambeault et al. (2008) find that there is a predicted positive relation between short-term incentive 
compensation (short-term stock option grants) for audit committee members and likelihood of restatement. The 
presence of audit committee financial expertise could help the company from fraud prevention and therefore 
improve firm performance. 
In Australia, the ACGPR explicitly requires that the AC include members who are all financially 
literate in that they are able to read and understand financial statements and at least one member should have 
relevant experience and education qualifications (i.e. qualified accountant or another finance professional with 
experience of financial and accounting matters) and that some members should have an understanding of the 
firm’s industry (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council 2007). Recent research confirms 
that accounting expertise within boards that are characterized by strong governance contributes to greater 
monitoring by the AC and leads to enhanced conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). 
The literature separates managerial experience from governance experience i.e. serving on other ACs or 
boards. Having experienced members on the AC contributes to significantly less misreporting and more effective 
monitoring (Raghunandan and Rama 2007). Greater independent director experience and greater audit 
knowledge results in more reliable reports (DeZoort 1998). The empirical evidence indicates that markets react 
more positively to the appointment of a new AC member who is an expert (Davidson et al.2004; DeFond et al. 
2005). Within the AC, the chair fulfils a key leadership role and hence should be the most qualified person on 
the AC. Where the AC chair has sufficient auditing background, it is very likely that the AC chair and the CFO 
will form a good working relationship. Although it is recognized that the chair of AC should have experience, 
Vafeas (2003) finds contrary evidence that 76% of AC chair’s do not have any auditing experience. While 
experience arguably contributes to AC effectiveness, when AC members have multiple directorships they can be 
overstretched and will not fulfill their fiduciary duties effectively. Consequently AC effectiveness is negatively 
impacted the more directorships AC members hold (Vafeas 2003).  
The study by Bedard & al (2004) states that there are three aspects to the expertise of the members of 
audit committees namely: financial expertise, the expertise of government and finally the specific expertise in of 
the firm. Similarly, Dezoort & al (2001) have found that the amount of experience of audit committee members 
as well as their knowledge of auditing is positively associated with the likelihood that members support the 
listener in the discussion of the managerial firm. 
Braiotta (1999) provides that members of the audit committee must have some skills in accounting and 
related fields. Likewise Price Waterhouse indicates that the expertise of the members of the Audit Committee in 
the field of accounting and finance is a key element of the effectiveness of this committee. Similarly Dezoort& al 
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(2002) require that audit committees consist of at least three independent members whose one of them has a high 
level of expertise in accounting and finance 
Research Methodology 
This study adopted an explanatory design.  Quantitative data relating to audit committee  size, gender diversity, 
number of independent directors and audit committee experience of Kenyan firms listed in the stock exchange 
was collected over the past six (8) years from 2006 to 2013 annual reports . Out of the 60 listed companies, the 
study comprised those that have been consistently trading for the study period (that is from 2008 – 2013). This 
was to eliminate the problem of missing data which will violate the precision and completeness principle.  This 
study utilized secondary data and data was collected by use of content analysis which was obtained from the 
annual financial statements reports of listed firms, annual investors’ reports, magazine and articles related to the 
financial performance of listed firms.   
Data Analysis  
Multiple Regressions was used because of its ability to use multiple independent variables to estimate their effect 
on a single dependent variable. This would predict a single dependent variable from any number of independent 
variables entered into regression equations. Blalock (1999) states that “if there are a large number of interval-
scale variables that are interrelated, it will be possible to predict any particular variable from any combination of 
the others’. The study thus used the technique to examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on 
financial performance.  The hypothesis was tested at 0.05 level of significance (95 confidence level)  
The regression model which assumed linearity, normality, constant and independence was  
Y= β0+ β1itX1it+ β2 it X2it +β 3itX3it+ β4itX4it + β5it X5it + β6itX6it +ε    
Y = The dependent variable (firm performance measured as return on assets 
β0 = Constant 
β1, β2, was the regression coefficients in Y by each variable of X 
 =  Audit committee experience  
X2 =  Audit committee size 
X3-X6=    Control variables such as Board size, Firm size, Board tenure, CEO duality 
     = Error 
Findings and discussions  
This sections presents results of this study based on the formulated objectives and hypotheses as presented in 
chapter one. Hypotheses are also tested with the study accepting or failing to accept them depending on the p 
values and t test value. 
Descriptive statistics  
Study findings in table 1 illustrated the results in all the sectors. Results in table 1 revealed that the audit 
committee experience for all sectors was 11 years (mean = 11.997). The audit committee was composed of an 
average of 13 members.The average board size for firms in NSE is 9 members with 14% CEO duality. The 
average ratio for firm size among all listed firms in NSE was 6.5566 and CEO tenure was 2 years (mean = 
2.7108). 
 Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Audit committee experience 40.18 69.27 11.997 6.27248 -0.067 -0.497 
Audit committee  size 8 14 13.4704 2.47717 0.908 1.039 
board size 3 16 9.2587 2.8598 -0.102 -0.582 
CEO duality 0 1 0.1439 0.35156 2.04 2.178 
Firm size 0 8.89 6.5566 1.25838 -1.426 4.17 
board tenure 1 6 2.7108 0.93681 0.221 0.987 
Correlation results 
Correlation analysis is a technique of assessing the relationship between variables: audit committee experience, 
audit committee size, board size, CEO duality, firm size, board tenure and firm performance. Thus, the study 
analyzed the relationships that are inherent among the independent and dependent variables. The results 
regarding this were summarized and presented in Table 2.  From the results, audit committee experience had 
positive significant effect relationship with firm performance (r = 0.310 which is significant at α = 0.01). Audit 
committee size was however, negatively correlated to firm performance (r -0.193significant at α = 0.01). Firm 
size was also shown to be negatively correlated to firm performance (r = 0.136, significant at α = 0.05).  CEO 
duality was negatively correlated to firm performance (r= -0.205 significant at α = 0.05). Furthermore, board 
tenure was positively related to firm performance as shown by correlation coefficient value of 0.391 (significant 
at α = 0.01).  
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Table 2  Correlation results 
 
Firm 
performance 
Audit committee 
experience 
Audit committee  
size 
board 
size 
CEO 
duality 
Firm 
size 
Board 
tenure 
Firm performance 1 
      Audit committee 
experience .310** 1 
     Audit committee  size -.193** .165** 1 
    Board size -0.098 0.067 0.048 1 
   CEO duality -0.205* 0.017 0.062 -.399** 1 
  Firm size -.136* -0.063 0.003 .121* -0.054 1 
 Board  tenure .391** .173** -0.092 0.008 -0.033 -0.003 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  Testing hypothesis  
Also, audit committee experience, committee gender, number of independent auditors and audit committee size 
explained 45.3% variation of firm performance. This showed that considering the independent variables, there is 
a probability of firm performance (R squared = 0.453). The Durbin Watson value of 1.743 was within the thumb 
rule of 2 thus no autocorrelation. Study results in table 3 revealed that F value 57.86, with p value = 0.000 
significant at 0.05, this implies that the joint prediction of audit committee experience, committee gender, 
number of independent auditors and audit committee size is significant. This shows that the model can be used in 
future to predict firm performance. The study rejected all the two hypotheses and interested that  audit committee 
experience showed a positive and significant effect on firm performance (β= 0.331, ρ<0.05. however, audit 
committee size showed a negative and significant effect on firm performance (β= -0.213, ρ<0.05). the finding 
coincide with Abbott et al. (2003) findings that audit committee financial expertise is  positively and 
significantly associated with firm performance Anderson et al. (2004) showed that an increase in audit 
committee experience leads to reduction in the cost of debt, in so doing the firm performance is improved 
Archambeault et al. (2008) echoes that the presence of audit committee financial expertise reduces the chances 
of fraud in a company thereby improving firm performance. However, tour findings on audit committee size 
disagrees with Sharma et al. (2009) that the number of members on the audit committee can potentially have a 
positive impact on firm performance. Nevertheless,  Anderson et al, (2004) states that large size audit 
committees can protect and control the process of accounting and finance compared to small committees because 
of greater transparency with respect to shareholders and creditors leading to improved firm performance 
Table 3  Multiple Regression Analysis  
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
  
 
B Std. Error Beta T Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -9.894 2.048 
 
-4.831 0.000 
  Audit committee experience 0.259 0.035 0.331 7.351 0.000 0.968 1.033 
Audit committee  size -0.419 0.096 -0.213 -4.366 0.000 0.824 1.214 
Board size -0.287 0.098 -0.172 -2.928 0.004 0.825 1.212 
CEO duality -2.272 0.791 -0.168 -2.874 0.004 0.84 1.191 
Firm size -0.407 0.215 -0.102 -1.895 0.059 0.979 1.022 
Board  tenure 1.968 0.273 0.386 7.206 0.000 0.998 1.002 
R Square 0.453 
      Adjusted R Square 0.446 
      Durbin-Watson 1.743 
      F 57.86 
      Sig. 0.0000 
      a Dependent Variable: firm performance  
   Conclusion And Recommendations  
The results of the study have shown that the presence of audit members with experience reduces the chances of 
financial misreporting which in turn improves firm performance. The chances of fraud are also reduced as well 
as the cost of debt. Further, vast wealth of experience of audit members is associated with quality monitoring and 
greater audit knowledge which is instrumental to improved firm performance. Finally, With increased size of the 
audit committee, firm performance is expected to decline because of the problem of free riders and the pressure 
to follow other members’ opinion without considering your argument. However, it can also be argued that large 
size audit committees can protect and control the process of accounting and finance since there is increased 
expert advice with increased size of the audit committee.  
It is therefore utmost necessary for firms to re-elect audit committee members that have served for more 
than 9 years to the board because of their vast experience. having experienced audit committee members should 
be a key priority for firms.there is need for firms to have an audit committee that is not too small such that there 
is lack of expert advice and too large such that it has free riders that are prone to follow other members opinion. 
The size of the audit committee should also be in a way that the process of accounting and finance are protected 
and firm performance is increased. 
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This study recommends that another study be done to augment finding in this study; it therefore 
recommends a study be done on more number of firms rather than including only firms in the NSE for the sake 
of generalizing the results of the study. Moreover, including moderator factors can also be made in the research 
models of the new research by other scholars in future.This study included only four factors, there could be some 
o her relevant factors that may be perceived important but were excluded from this study. Future researches, 
therefore, may consider more factors, like audit committee meetings, audit committee financial expertise and 
other variables such as audit committee composition that can influence firm performance.  
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